The Geneva Accord - Open Forum with Yossi Beilin, Yasser Abed Rabbo and other Drafters, Washington, 12/3/03
The Geneva Accord, an unofficial "virtual" peace agreement negotiated over the last two
and a half years by leading Israeli and Palestinian private citizens, many of whom were
involved in the former Oslo peace process, was introduced in Geneva recently at a ceremony
attended by Jimmy Carter and other world leaders. On December 3, Americans for Peace Now,
the Foundation for Middle East Peace, and the American Task Force for Palestine sponsored
an open forum for six of the drafters of the Accord in Washington at the Carnegie
Endowment. The Geneva team included Yossi Beilin, Daniel Levy and Shaul Arieli from Israel,
and Yasser Abd Rabbo, Sami al Ahbed, and Nabil Kassis from Palestine. Philip C. Wilcox,
Jr., President, Foundation for Middle East Peace, Debra deLee, Chief Executive Officer,
Americans for Peace Now, and Rafat Dajani, Executive Director of the American Task Force
for Palestine introduced the group. An edited transcript follows.
Question:What is the position of the Geneva Accord on the right of return?
Yossi Beilin: The issue of the refugees is one of the most difficult. We tried to tackle
it in a way that would answer the needs of both parties, not as a zero-sum game, but a
win-win game. We did not begin from scratch because we had the Clinton plan, which gave us
the basis for an overall solution, including the refugee issue. We decided that we would not
argue about our respective national narratives, but that instead we would solve the problem.
We Israelis decided that we would not demand that the Palestinians give up on the dream of
returning to their homes in Israel, only that they should agree that the right of return
should be limited to numbers decided by Israel. The solution itself is the solution,
and this the most important thing. Nor did we ask Israelis to give up their dreams of
rebuilding the Temple on the TempleMount, but we reached a practical solution that the
TempleMount should be under Palestinian sovereignty.
The agreed solution to the refugee issue is fair to both sides and balanced. It includes
compensation for everyone who meets the definition of a refugee, compensation for assets
that are in Israel and belong to the refugees, and it give the refugees five options for a
permanent place of residence. The first is the new Palestinian state. Once it is sovereign,
all refugees will be invited. The second is to resettle in territories that were under
Israeli sovereignty but will be annexed to the Palestinian state as a result of the exchange
of land. The third option for resettlement is the countries where refugees live today, if
those countries agree. Jordan accepts this, but Lebanon is a problem. For those countries
that agree, there will be a process of rehabilitation and then they will live there
permanently. The fourth option is third countries, like the U.S.,Canada, Germany Australia,
Spain, and other countries, which are willing to absorb refugees. The fifth option is Israel
itself. Of course, this is the most delicate issue. Israel will make a sovereign decision on
how many refugees it is willing to take. In deciding, it will have to take into consideration
as a basis for its decision, the average quotas that third countries are accepting. It is
not surprising that the major criticism in Israel of our solution is that the Palestinians
did not give up, in writing, the right of return, and the main criticism on the Palestinian
side is that the Palestinians gave up on the right of return. For us, the question was not
who is right and who is wrong? The question for us was how do we solve the problem, not how
to win the case. We avoided that trap, and instead came up with a win-win solution that will
resolve permanently the question of refugee claims.
Question: How are you going to sell this plan to your respective communities, a clear majority,
so that we can take the next steps towards peace?
Samih al Ahbed: This is the first time that Israelis and Palestinians have started to talk
about specific issues in more detail. In contrast to the Oslo Declaration of Principles,
which failed, we did not talk about principles or a framework for the solution. On the
contrary, we sought detailed agreements on specific issues that we had been unable to
obtain at Camp David, Taba, or in earlier talks. We also presented our draft to the
population, both in Palestine and in Israel, to consider it before any official agreement
is made. This is a very different methodology. We want the public to feel like they own
this document and the solution, and that they can solve the problem themselves without
having solutions imposed on them. This is the best way of selling this document to our
population - to give it to the people and let them make up their mind.
Daniel Levy: We Israelis who have participated in this agreement have been arguing that the
narrative that says there is no one to talk to and nothing to talk about was unacceptable
to us. There is a whole new public debate now that we have produced this document. Formerly,
we argued that there was, indeed, a partner for peace. But now we have a document that
proves we have a partner and a plan. Now we are both in a position to give a very different
message to our publics. We are already shifting the debate in Israel. The polls are relatively
encouraging. The latest poll in Ha'aretz, on the day of the launching event on Monday, showed 31 % of Israelis supportingGeneva, 37% against. and 20% undecided.This is very encouraging.
We have to thank the government of Ariel Sharon for coming out in such a hysterical fashion
against the agreement, which really pumped it up in the media. The way in which they did
this was very revealing. They attacked the document as illegitimate, claiming we went behind
the backs of the government, and that this was not democratic. They chose not to attack the
substance of the document because they understood that it is acceptable to the silent majority
in Israel and Palestine. Our challenge is to mobilize and re-empower that silent majority.
It has been very difficult to do, and we hope that this will give a tool to those in our
camp who had lost faith, and to those beyond our camp who were not convinced that we could
change our situation.
In Israel, the equation can be put into stunningly simple terms: the settlements and the
outposts are paving the way to the end of the state of Israel as a Jewish and democratic
state, full stop. This agreement gives us an extremely effective vehicle for arguing that
case. We have distributed it to every household in Israel in Hebrew. We have also distributed
an Arabic version to the Arab towns and villages in Israel. This is one of our last shots,
we think, for a two-state solution.
The Geneva plan has created a new debate that works to our advantage.
As a result, everyone is clamoring for their own plan. Sharon has sent his son to meet with
Arafat's security advisor in London. Shinui has come up with a plan for moving the settlers
from Netzarim, but leaving the army there. The settler movement came out with an apartheid
plan for cantonizing the occupied territories. And Sharon has rediscovered the roadmap.
Question: How are you going to sell this to the White House, Capitol Hill and Colin Powell?
Nabil Kassis: As for selling this to the White House, I don't know a lot about marketing,
but I think that one way to sell something is to show the potential buyer that it's in their
best interest. Now it has been the conventional wisdom in the United States that peace in
the Middle East is a vital national interest. Finally, the United States has accepted the
two-state solution. Let us call it the Bush vision. We discovered this a bit earlier, but
we're happy that President Bush has come to terms with this vision and accepted it as his
own and that the rest of the world agrees.
But the two-state solution and, therefore, the chance for peace, are slipping away because
of the building of the wall and the continuing annexation of Palestinian territories for
settlements. If peace is in the interest of the United States, then one has to make the
point on Capitol Hill that we should not procrastinate, and we should do what it takes to
realize this vision. Now we have shown how it can be done. The Road Map is the only official
plan on the table right now. But if it reaches the third phase, the question remains, what's
next? The Geneva Accord provides the answer. It shows that a final settlement solution
exists. If it is in the interest of the United States to solve the problem in the Middle
East, this Accord is worth supporting. I was here last month speaking to people on Capitol
Hill and they were very receptive. But are they willing to take action?
Yasser Abd Rabbo: I want to add to what Nabil said. Throughout our history, the world was
trying to persuade us to solve our problem. Now for the first time, we have come up with a
solution ourselves. In the past we would address our publics and say this is the Rogers
plan, the Reagan plan, the George Schulz-Bush initiative, or the Clinton, Mitchell, Tenet,
or George W. Bush plan. Since these are American plans, how could we oppose them? But now,
for the first time, we have our own plan. We want you to accept and defend it because it is
the only balanced solution.
Now, many people say the issue of refugees is the most difficult. I say no. Sometimes there
are issues that are very marginal, but they come to the front and you find yourself stuck
over them. The most difficult thing for us in the past 2 ½ years has been trying to find a
line of balance that cuts all through the issues in this package, so that both Israelis and
Palestinians will conclude that their basic aspirations and needs are met and do not
contradict each other. We have shown that it is not necessary that in order to fulfill my
aspirations, I must destroy yours. Instead, we show that in order to fulfill my aspirations
they must be reconciled with yours. We are not preaching this as a sermon. We are offering
a very concrete solution, based on previous experience.
Second, our solution proves to the two nations, Palestinian and Israeli, to the other
nations in the region and to the Americans, that there is a possible way for solving your
problems through reconciliation, through historical compromise, and through negotiations
that take into account the basic interests and needs of both sides and find a balance between them.
Our work shows that there is an alternative to the extremists and fundamentalists who
oppose reconciliation, compromise, and dialogue. Our option presents a serious risk, not only
on a personal level, but also on the political and ideological level. But we hope it will
be an example, not only for Israel and Palestine, but all over the Arab and Islamic world.
If it fails, the forces of extremism will grow even stronger. That's why the White House
should support our way of solving things, in order to protect not only our interests, but
American interests as well. As for what happened in the past, for example, during the
Clinton era, we will leave it for historians. Of course we can learn from the past.
Recalling Camp David, we might recommend that universities organize a course on "How not
to arrange negotiations." But now we must look to the future.
Question: What is the relationship between the Geneva agreement and the Ayalon-Nusseibeh project?
Have Ayalon and Nusseibeh signed on to the Geneva project?
Yasser Abd Rabbo: The Ayalon-Nusseibeh peace initiative takes a different approach.
Shaul Arieli: About the differences between our approach and Ayalon and Nusseibeh, I want
to present two examples. When Bibi Netanyahu was prime minister, he accepted 242 in the Wye
memorandum and the Hebron memorandum, but he intended to keep almost half of the
territories. Also on the Palestinian side, they accepted 242 that calls for a fair and just
solution to the refugee problem, but some of them still claim the right of return under
Resolution 194. The Ayalon-Nusseibeh initiative is a series of brief points, whereas our
agreement addresses details, not principles. We confronted the sensitive issues in detail
and found solutions to them.
Question: After the breakdown of peace at Camp David, Barak and Clinton blamed the Palestinians
and the American people were led to believe that Israel has no partner for peace.
Have any former Clinton administration officials changed their views and endorsed endorse
the Geneva proposal?
Yossi Beilin: President Clinton sent an endorsement letter to us in Geneva, and we have
received warm support from Madeleine Albright and Sandy Berger. Generally speaking, the
people who were around Clinton, and Clinton himself, are supporting this initiative.
Yasser Abd Rabbo: Whom do we represent? On the Palestinian side, we represent the
mainstream. We have our extremists, but we have always had them. What we have lacked in the
last three years is a platform that will unite all the moderates, and that will reunite
the Palestinian mainstream. Our plan provides this.
On the Israeli side, besides Yossi Beilin, you have Avram Burg, Amram Mitzna,
retired generals from the army, retired officials from Israeli Security, and people from
left, center and right. The plan is winning over 30% of the Israeli support, in spite of
what I call the brainwashing that has been directed through the years, to both the
Palestinians and the Israeli public, saying there is no partner and no possible solution
and that the we have no choice but to go on destroying and killing each other. It is
unbelievable that we have won support from 30% of the Israelis in the first days after
releasing the plan, notwithstanding all the negative propaganda that has demonized the
other side and argued that it is impossible to achieve anything.
Shaul Arieli: This conflict existed before Barak became prime minister and still exists
after Sharon replaced him. This conflict and the duty to solve it do not belong to one
person. This is a national conflict and this group has had the courage to cope with the
sensitive issues and to conclude them. Barak and Arafat lacked this courage at Camp David.
Question: In a recent op-ed, Charles Krauthammer accused Yossi Beilin of being gullible.
The author claimed that many of the Palestinian undertakings in this agreement were also
promised at Oslo, but systematically violated thereafter. So why should we believe them
now? Why should we base Israel's security on an agreement that simply repeats promises that
were made ten years ago and systematically repudiated.
Yossi Beilin: It is true that many people in Israel, like Mr. Krauthammer, believed that
Oslo was a mistake and were disillusioned about peace. As a result they rejected the peace
camp and voted for Sharon who said people who talk about peace are naïve and do not
understand the Arabs, who only understand force. Sharon promised peace and security by using
force. But after three years under Sharon, there have been more civilian casualties in
Israel and in Palestine than at any other period in 55 years. There is no peace or security,
yet Krauthammer advocates more of the same. He and others like him believe we can put an end
to this conflict by continuing to kill people and using force until they crawl to us and say,
whatever solution you suggest to us we can accept. This is the most childish kind of naivete'
Also, we have another problem that Krauthammer doesn't have. We are Jews who live in Israel
and believe in Zionism, which means a Jewish majority in a democracy that gives full rights
to the Arabs in Israel. Now, if there is a Jewish minority dominating a majority of Arabs,
how can we be a democratic and Jewish state? And if Israel is either not democratic, or not
Jewish, then the whole Zionist idea fails. Those few of us who are Zionists fear the end of
our dream and our parents' dream if we don't do something. The Krauthammers of the world
are telling us to do nothing. For them, maybe this is a solution. For us, it is the end.
Question: How many people support the details of the program? How many of these are
convinced that there is a negotiating partner on the other side? I understand Arafat hasn't
come out in support of the Accord. What decision did Fatah's central committee make? How can
you prove that if there were an Israeli government that would support it, then the PLO
would also support it? What was Arafat's role and the PLO's in this initiative, and why
aren't they supporting it now?
Yasser Abd Rabbo: In some circles, all the evils of the world are attributed to Arafat ,
yet when Arafat says something positive publicly and openly, it is ignored. Arafat sent an
official message in his name, and it was read in Geneva, in front of the hundreds of
participants, including of course, world dignitaries, presidents and ex-presidents,
including former President Carter.
Chairman Arafat's message supported this initiative and called upon the entire world to
support it, because it gives a real basis for hope for both sides. Before that, two
statements were made by the Palestinian leadership headed by Arafat. I'm a member of the
Palestinian leadership, I report to the Palestinian leadership, I'm not an amateur, and
I've been working as a politician for over 35 years. Nor is Arafat an amateur. He supports
and endorses this, and he believes that this is a way that we all should take in order to
return back to the normal forms of solving our problems.
At every turning point over the years, Arafat was the key figure who influenced Palestinian
public opinion for the better. This is not propaganda, this is history, recent history,
today's history. Without his support, I tell you, our road will be very difficult. But, to
ask Arafat to stand and say, we adopt this document as an official, we adopt every single
word and item in it, I myself did not advise this. I met with him after we signed the
cover letter at the Dead Sea and told him what we had achieved, but I did not recommend
that the Palestinian leadership adopt the Accord officially. I said I need your endorsement,
your support, and your encouragement to go forward. This will help me, not only among the
Palestinians, but among the Israelis and internationally.
The last thing that I want to say is that, yes, we have opposition, but the mainstream in
the Palestinian national movement was, and still is, moderate. Ahmed Qureia, the prime
minister, supports what we are doing. Abu Mazen, the ex-prime minister, supports what we
are doing. They know where we are heading. And without this, of course, it would be very
difficult for us. We had 200 Palestinians with us at Geneva. Among them were ex-prisoners,
mostly Fatah people, and among them were young generation militants, who are still leading
a struggle in the streets. There were also intellectuals, peasants, businessmen, and
wealthy Palestinians who came from the United States, Europe, and elsewhere abroad. It was
a very strange and unique scene, seeing Palestinians who are graduates of Israeli prisons,
graduates of Harvard and officials of banks and companies, sitting side by side. These
people represent the majority of Palestinian society.
Remember that we are still in the first month after we started the campaign. Maybe half of
the people received the document in their homes, though I doubt a high percentage of them
read all 60 or 70 pages. But 31% have already expressed support. That's a very good
beginning in the first month. We have not even started different forms of campaigning, so
let us be patient. We are overcoming decades of hatred and suspicion and three years of
very fierce clashes and fighting between us, and now today we are confronting the wall,
which poses a threat to our dream of a genuine lasting peace. The situation is urgent, and
we have a large responsibility. So does the American administration.
Question: What kind of solution did you offer for the problem of water?
Daniel Levy: We dealt with all the core issues in the document, but there are other issues,
such as water, that will be addressed in annexes that will be drafted by experts.
Question: The government of Israel announced, again today, more construction and the US
government seems not be able to bring them to a standstill. Under your plan, which settlements
must go, and which will stay?
Shaul Arieli: Here are the principles in the agreement that define how the border will be
demarcated and which settlements will be evacuated. The border between Israel and Palestine
will be based on the 1967 line. The second, the land swap, will be made in a one-to-one
ratio based on the party's interests or needs. The no man's land that exists near the '67
line will be divided between the parties. And the last, neither party will annex
residential areas or residents of the other party.
Under these principles, Israel will absorb settlement blocs that contain 110,000 settlers
The Israeli neighborhoods in East Jerusalem that include 200,000 Israelis will be annexed.
110,000 Israelis living in 120 out of 140, including all settlements in the Gaza Strip,
will be evacuated. In return for annexing Israeli blocs, Israel will transfer to
Palestinian land in two areas, west of Judea and east of the Gaza Strip. We will extend the
Gaza Strip by more than 90 square kilometers, almost 25% of the current area of the Gaza
Strip, which is only 363 square kilometers.
Daniel Levy: In dealing with the settlement issue, we had to acknowledge that there were
facts on the ground and that if we were to reach agreement we would have to deal with this
reality, even though many Israelis had opposed the settlement enterprise in the first place.
The negotiators agreed that if there was a Palestinian capacity to accommodate a certain
Israeli need, then it had to be compensated for. In other words, if there could be
modifications made to the 1967 lines, which would not derogate from the viability and
contiguity of the Palestinian state, and if the Palestinians were willing to consider such
modifications, then there would a territorial compensation exactly along the lines that
Shaul just outlined. Israel has no interest either in having islands of Israeli sovereignty
that are indefensible, such as Ariel, which is 18 kilometers deep into the heart of the
state of Palestine. Once we established the principle of a one-to-one land swap, we were cautious
about what settlements we would keep because we knew we would have go give an equal areas
of land to the Palestinians in return.
Question: I was wondering if this agreement looks good only in relation to Sharon's
policies. Your agreement legitimizes about 50% of the settlers, especially in the sensitive
areas around Jerusalem. So 5 out of 10 settlers will get to stay. As for the Palestinian
refugees who might be able to return to Israel, perhaps, 30,000 out of 5 million, or 6 per
1,000 - does that suggest that because of the imbalance of power, the Palestinians are
eager to pay a high price for an agreement? As a Palestinian refugee, do I get to go back?
Who decides? Letting go of Palestinians right of return, guaranteed under international
law, seems like too high of a price, just because we want to have a Jewish state and cater
to the concerns of Jews living in historic Palestine.
Nabil Kassis: In response to the question about sacrificing rights, we were eager to show
that an agreement was possible. Agreements always entail departure from starting positions.
But the Accord is not official, since only governments can make agreements. But we have
shown that an agreement is possible, and our document illustrates what an agreement should
look like, more or less. Most people believe that an agreed, rather than an imposed
settlement, would be something close to what we have produced. Ultimately, Israelis and
Palestinians will have an opportunity to support, or oppose, whatever agreement is
ultimately negotiated, through referenda. This Accord is important because it shows people
what an agreement is likely to look like. Those who want an imposed solution or a solution
achieved through violence and war, at least now know what they will be missing and that
there is an alternative.
If you're going to negotiate a solution rather than impose a solution, then it has to be
something that is agreeable to the other party. The Arab League initiative and Resolutions
242 and 338 all envisage negotiations and agreement. To reach an agreement you need a
partner. I believe Resolution 242 requires Israel's withdrawal from all the territories
occupied in 1967, but I acknowledge others disagree. So we must negotiate and compromise to
reach agreement.
We are going through a very difficult time today in the Middle East. We should not rush
into a rash solution, but we must find a solution soon. The possibility of a two-state
solution is in jeopardy, and if this fails, the conflict will continue for a very long time.
This threat is very real, and provides an incentive for us to seek solutions. Of course,
at the end of the day it's up to the peoples on both sides to accept one solution or to
reject it. But it would be irresponsible to find that a solution exists and not to show
this to the public.
Yasser Abd Rabbo: One final thought.We should be wary of dealing with complicated national
conflicts in abstract ways. If we do, coming generations in next 50 years will continuation
to suffer, and this will have grave consequences for the whole region. Absolute justice is
impossible anywhere, at least not here on this earth.
Question: I want to promote the Geneva accords within the American community, especially to
the administration, and would like to have Arabs and Jews working together. How do we
coordinate our efforts with the initiators, specifically whom do we talk to and how do we
coordinate things in this country?
Yossi Beilin: We are trying to form a joint organization in the United States,
"Supporters for the Geneva draft agreement." We can't give you an address now, but we need
your help, and if wish to leave us your details, we will get back to you.
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